Sins of commission

“Britain has a social care crisis,” says the headline above Wes Streeting’s latest piece in the Guardian. “Here’s how Labour plans to fix it.”

And how does Labour plan to fix it? Why, by “announcing an independent commission on building a National Care Service” of course. Crossbench peer Louise Casey has agreed to chair the commission, which will “publish its interim report next year and conclude towards the end of the parliament”. The “plan to fix it” appears to be to ask Casey to come up with a plan to fix it in a few years’ time.

Those familiar with the history of social care reform would be forgiven for feeling a degree of frustration with this turn of events, because this is far from the first such commission. In fact, we’ve known for 30 years that we need a new solution to how we provide and pay for social care in England, and we know very well what the options are. We just keep not doing anything.

A brief history of playing for time

The modern history of (non) reform begins with the Royal Commission that reported in 1999, recommending a more generous tax-funded system providing free personal care. The Labour government didn’t implement its recommendations. In 2002, the Wanless review of NHS funding pointed out that social care funding also needed looking at, but again this wasn’t followed up. In 2009 we got as far as the Prime Minister Gordon Brown announcing free personal care at home for some people, but this was never implemented because it turned out that it would cost money.

After the coalition government took office in 2010, they asked Andrew Dilnot to chair a Commission on Funding of Care and Support. Dilnot, aware that the high cost of reform was likely to be a barrier, recommended a model that didn’t pay for all personal care, but capped people’s lifetime costs. Legislation was drawn up to implement a (significantly watered down) version of his proposals, but following the 2015 election, the Conservative Party kicked reform into the long grass by delaying implementation until 2020. Since then, we have been stuck in a political loop of pretending we are going to do some version of the Dilnot reforms and then refusing to pay for them.

A political problem

These previous commissions have been through the options in detail and attempted to land different models. So what can we possibly hope to achieve by going around that loop again?

One thing that we can learn from picking through the bones of previous attempts at reform is that the problem is not a technical one. A belief that a clever technical solution could help us dodge difficult decisions and trade-offs is what led the coalition government to appoint Dilnot – an economist and former director of the IFS – as chair of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support. Dilnot understood that this was the ask and duly recommended the cleverest available technical solution to solve an insurance problem that the private sector could not cover, with the minimum public expenditure. This reduced the trade-offs involved, but of course it did not eliminate them entirely and reform was ultimately blocked by the Treasury on the grounds that spending money is bad.

The problem is instead a political one. As an ageing society, we haven’t agreed how we are going to look after those who can no longer care for themselves. The status quo looks increasingly unacceptable, but public opinion and our political system have been failing to settle on an alternative for the past 30 years.

To be clear, this isn’t an easy problem. Other countries are also struggling with this to a greater or lesser extent and they don’t all take the same approach. In some Mediterranean countries like Italy, extended families (yes, largely the women) still provide most of the support that people need as they age and there is less formal social care. In Scandinavian countries like Sweden, the state supports people through generous tax-funded social care. Other countries like Germany have established social insurance schemes specifically for social care needs.

In England, we find ourselves caught between these models: an increasingly atomised society where people can’t always rely on their families, with no history or public understanding of social insurance and an unwillingness to pay the higher taxes that are required for more generous state support.

Breaking the cycle

So yes, this is a political problem, and getting us out of 30 years of stagnation on this issue is going to require some political leadership. It is disappointing that, rather than showing leadership by making bold changes early in this parliament, the government has decided to outsource that leadership to yet another independent commission. If we are looking for silver linings, perhaps the appointment of Casey – an experienced campaigner and political operator, rather than a policy expert – shows that the government understands that the problem is indeed political.

But Casey, Streeting and anyone else who wants to achieve meaningful reform will have to realise where exactly this political problem sits. History backs up Streeting’s assertion that “general election campaigns are where plans for social care go to die”. But much of the opposition to reform over the past decade has come from within government. The Treasury has never been convinced of the imperative to spend money on social care. Quite the opposite in fact: in implementing George Osborne’s austerity programme, they realised that there were few political consequences for central government of imposing ever more brutal budget cuts on local authorities. In Whitehall, the Treasury is in charge unless Number 10 tells them otherwise, so it is unlikely that this particular political problem will be solved unless Starmer (or whoever is Prime Minster when we are finally done kicking the can down the road) is willing to force the issue.

Meta-priorities for NHS reform

We are two months in and, as far as NHS reform goes, the new government is still in a stage of political positioning and information gathering.

Lord Darzi’s report, published yesterday, tells us that the NHS is in a bad state. Everything is worse than it was in 2010: waiting lists have soared, cancer outcomes are lagging behind comparable countries, and nearly one in ten people attending A&E now waits for over 12 hours (yes, you read that right). On top of this, a decade of mismanagement and under-resourcing left the NHS weakened and less able to respond to the global pandemic than other health systems – an idea reminiscent of Chris Cook’s contemporaneous writing on how the British state’s obsession with efficiency had left the NHS far too fragile.

Although Darzi identifies some themes that need addressing, specific policy recommendations were outside the scope of the review. We will have to wait until next spring when the new government publishes its ten-year strategy to hear what they plan to do about all of this. However, Wes Streeting has given us regular clues as to what he thinks the priorities are for NHS reform, talking about three big shifts: from hospital to community, from analogue to digital; and from sickness to prevention.

Anyone with a passing familiarity with NHS politics and policy will immediately notice two things. The first is that these three shifts are terribly familiar. They are mantras that have been repeated by most of Streeting’s predecessors as Health Secretary, to the point that they sound almost like meaningless clichés.

The second is that, despite this remarkable consistency, the NHS has failed to deliver on any of them. While telling everyone that care is moving out of hospital, the NHS has consistently increased funding for acute care quicker than for community care. For all the dubious excitement about AI, the NHS has a history of failed IT programmes and struggles with fragmented systems and data. And a narrative about the importance of prevention has been accompanied by significant cuts to public health grants over the past decade. As Darzi puts it “the NHS has implemented the inverse of its stated strategy”.

As such, rather than asking what the new government’s priorities for the NHS are or should be, it may be more worthwhile to ask what they need to do to have a chance of bucking recent trends and actually delivering on some of the things they say they want to do. Rather than focusing on priorities, we need to start talking about meta-priorities – the things that need to be addressed to give any priorities a chance of succeeding. Without any claim to completeness, I am going to propose four.

1. Actually try to improve things

The first meta-priority should be the easiest, but political realities are not always thus. Any serious attempt to deliver on Streeting’s three big shifts has to start with a government that is acting in good faith and actually trying to improve the delivery of public services – rather than looking at polls and headlines and managing its public messaging.

This would be, to say the least, a reversal of recent trends. While ministers should have been tackling the appalling condition of much of the NHS estate, they instead decided they liked the phrase “40 new hospitals” and tried to convince us that they could simply redefine what that phrase means so that it wasn’t a lie. In place of serious discussion about how the NHS is run, we have for years been served vague and largely meaningless concepts like “integration”.

The barriers to acting in this way should be lower now than at any point over the past decade. Labour politicians and voters are more ideologically committed to public services than their Conservative counterparts. And a new government – especially one inheriting a legacy of obviously degraded public services – has a decent window of opportunity in which they can be honest about the problems with the NHS and blame them on the other guys.

This government seems keen to make the most of this opportunity, and the brutal assessments in the Darzi review are a start. But they need to get out of campaigning mode and into governing mode. They need to use some of that political capital to solve the many difficult and inconvenient problems that the NHS faces. And they need to have the courage to keep actually trying to improve things once the honeymoon period is over and the next election looms.

2. Turn off the false assurance machine

The problem with having a government that cares more about managing public opinion than improving the NHS is that this behaviour permeates the system. All the minister really wants is a good line to spin to the press and the public, so all they need from NHS England is a plausible story that things are going well and/or there is a plan for things to go well in the future. This is  then the demand that goes down through each layer of the system: tell me a plausible story that things are fine.

This manifests most traceably in the utter nonsense that is NHS financial planning, where local health systems are required to give NHS England the “right answer”, which is that they can deliver on the numerous promises that have been made to the public while sticking to the budgets handed down to them. Local NHS leaders dutifully submit fictional plans and wait to be told how naughty they are when the fictions do not become reality.

But it’s also evident in the way that the NHS reports and manages its performance. NHS England requires the right numbers on a narrow set of targets that imperfectly represent a tiny proportion of the complexity that the NHS is managing. Local health systems do what they can to give the right answers, even if they don’t believe that’s an accurate description of what’s going on.

If the purpose of a system is what it does, then the purpose of the various layers of NHS management is to generate false assurance. And running this false assurance machine is expensive. Some of the most highly paid people in the NHS are spending large amounts of their time providing the right answers to the layers above them rather than doing the hard and boring work of improving the system below them. As Darzi says, “the NHS encourages too many to look upwards rather than to those that they are there to serve”.

Turning this machine off starts with the political courage to actually try to improve things, but it will take much more than that. These behaviours are deeply entrenched in NHS organisations and people will need to feel safe before they can act differently. Changing a huge and complex system is hard and will take time. But it is essential: you are going to struggle to improve a system that is not providing you with honest information.

3. Spend money where it is really needed

The UK public sector has a strange and enduring ideology that says you cannot simply spend money to improve things. The problem, you see, is one of incentives. If health systems get more money when they are struggling, where is the incentive for them to, you know, stop struggling? Health systems are seen as rational actors in an economic model, in a weird conflation of the senior managers who are supposed to be running the thing (and whose pay is unrelated to these performance measures) and the population that suffers when bad management is compounded by a withholding of further government funding.

Darzi makes the case for financial incentives and competition playing a role in driving improvement in some parts of the NHS. He argues that they are “part of the way in which the NHS got to peak performance” in the 2000s. But the 2012 reforms introduced by Andrew Lansley took this to a ridiculous extreme by “dissolving the NHS management line” and creating a fragmented and baffling system searching in vain for the magic of the market.

Since then, we have seen a series of increasingly bizarre “payment for performance” schemes. When the Better Care Fund was launched in 2013 as a pooled budget between the NHS and local government, £1bn of the £3.8bn was allocated based on performance. Systems that saw reductions in avoidable emergency admissions and delays in discharging patients would be given more money than those that struggled to shift those measures. More recently, NHS England decided to allocate desperately needed capital investment to the hospital trusts that performed best (or improved most) on the highly political A&E 4-hour target.

Following the OBR’s recent finding that public investment boosts long-term growth, the government may have political cover to make the big investments that are required to fix NHS infrastructure. It’s important that this money goes where it’s needed and is not coopted into some Freakonomics-inspired game of incentives. This may require Number 10 to face down the ultimate source of this ideology: His Majesty’s Treasury.

4. Shift the locus of political accountability

While there is a narrative in the UK that the NHS is a unique and special health system, many experts argue that it is not so different from what you find in other countries. It does distinguish itself, however, by being more politicised and more centralised than its peers.

It is perhaps unavoidable and even desirable that the NHS is politicised, since health and social care make up over 20% of government spending. The problem is that, in a highly centralised system, the politics of health care become centralised. When local NHS leaders talk about their accountability to local populations, they are talking about a sense of moral duty. Their real, hard-edged accountability is to the people who can tell them what to do or remove them from their jobs – NHS England. If people want better health care services where they live, any political pressure has to be directed at a national level, to the Secretary of State and to central government.

This matters because people’s views of issues at a national level can be unmoored from their local experiences. I remember, many years ago, seeing a presentation from Ben Page of Ipsos Mori, in which he showed that people – wherever they lived – tended to think that the NHS near them was rather good, but that nationally it was in a bad state. The inference was that people formed opinions of local services based on their own experiences and opinions of the NHS as a whole based on media reports. For similar reasons, areas with the lowest levels of immigration are often the most strongly opposed to it.

This means that national-level political accountability has a relatively weak link to people’s experiences of the NHS. And what’s more, the link is mediated by layers of NHS management and media reporting, encouraging some of the problems described above. When people are upset that their local hospital is crumbling, ministers talk about the “40 new hospitals” they are building, generating headlines but not fixing any ceilings. When people want better access to local services, ministers produce statistics generated by the false assurance machine.

Shifting the locus of political accountability to a local level could bring political incentives into line with the realities of how people experience their local NHS services. This could in turn solve some of the political and systemic problems outlined above. But the weakness of local government in England may make this impossible in the short term. England is “an international outlier in its lack of local power and autonomy for sub-national government” and the previous government went out of its way to remove further powers and autonomy from local authorities.

Labour has talked about a “devolution revolution”. Like Wes Streeting’s NHS priorities, these are familiar words that have not to date been matched by actions. But if we really are going to see a growing role for local democracy and a genuine transfer of power from central government, this could open up longer-term options for fixing some of the NHS’s most pervasive problems.

Escaping the zero-sum game of paying for public services

It is an old cliché that people in the UK want European levels of public services for US levels of taxation – even if the last government achieved closer to US levels of public services for European levels of taxation.

And maybe there is nothing wrong with this: any economist will tell you that a rational individual will happily receive more than they have paid for. Perhaps a more accurate, and damning, version of the cliché is that people in the UK have been surprisingly willing to believe politicians who tell us that we can always have more for less.

There is a long history of British politicians announcing that they will fund better public services without providing any additional money, with the one cool trick of just making them more efficient. Whether it’s drones and AI freeing up police and NHS time; then chancellor Rishi Sunak personally removing £5.5bn of public sector waste; or periodic crackdowns on tax evasion there is always another wheeze to get something for nothing. All of which is terribly convenient for politicians who don’t want to make tough decisions or sell difficult trade-offs to the public.

So in that context, the old cliché is a helpful reminder. We have to take some decisions about what sort of country we want to live in, and they come with trade-offs. We shouldn’t take politicians seriously if they aren’t facing up to these choice.

Except that, if we swing too far the other way, we end up in the terribly fatalistic position of arguing that running public services is a zero-sum game and nothing can be improved without extra cash. While this may sound like a wise and serious attitude, it is incongruous with the experiences of many people working in the UK’s public sector, who can see very clearly the levels of waste and inefficiency that result from things being run badly.

I wrote earlier this year about how the most highly paid NHS managers spend large amounts of their time developing and discussing financial plans that they all know will never be delivered, to satisfy NHS England’s (fairly explicit) demands for false assurance. The direct cost of the time wasted in this way must be huge. The opportunity cost of having your most senior managers focus on this, rather than running health care services, is probably bigger.

Rather more attention has been paid to the fact that public sector productivity, as estimated by the Office for National Statistics, took a big hit during the Covid pandemic and has not fully recovered, with the NHS taking a particularly large nosedive (figure 1). We are just not getting as much out of the resources we put in as we did a few years ago. A number of theories exist as to why this is and what we should do about it, but it doesn’t seem fanciful to think that it should be possible to recoup these productivity losses.

Figure 1 – Office for National Statistics productivity estimates from 1997/98 to 2021/22

But as always, identifying problems is easy and fixing them is rather harder. Saying that there are huge inefficiencies in the NHS is not the same as saying we can make corresponding efficiency gains. Simply getting the Chief Executive of NHS England to agree that the NHS will become 2% more efficient every year [£] does not amount to a plan.

So where does this leave us? We know that there are huge levels of inefficiency and dysfunction in the way that our public services are run, but the answers we are offered by politicians tend to be simple solutions, of which we are rightly suspicious, or just assertions that things will become more efficient.

Part of the problem is that any serious answer is going to be rather boring. Many of the problems in the public sector, and the NHS in particular, boil down to just needing to run things better. Running large organisations and complex systems is a difficult and often thankless task. It involves working through accountabilities and information flows to ensure that a system is capable of managing the complexity that it is faced with and delivering on its purpose. It requires meaningful delegation of decision-making and resisting the urge to aggressively micromanage a narrow set of measures to generate political soundbites. If you get it right, says Stafford Beer in Diagnosing the System for Organisations, “the problems that were worrying people will then be not so much solved as dissolved. This means that you will not get any credit.” It is hardly a wonder that politicians have little appetite for this kind of enterprise and prefer false assurance and cool tricks.

And this is what it ultimately boils down to. Politicians do need the political will to resource our public services properly, but they also need the political will to accept that, as custodians of a huge and complex system like the NHS, they have to ask their officials to do the hard and boring work of running things better. They need to stop asking for false assurance and start asking that the information on which the system is managed is honest, even if it is inconvenient.

If I can offer a glimmer of hope, this might be rather easier to do immediately after a change of government. What will be harder is sustaining the inconvenient honesty into the next election.

Bad politics and bad management in the NHS

“To be clear,” wrote Richard Murray and Siva Anandaciva last year in the Health Service Journal (The Wretchedness of NHS Financial Planning, July 2023 [£]), “this is not fraud.” Richard was then Chief Executive of the King’s Fund, one of the country’s leading health think tanks, and Siva the Chief Analyst. 

When two of the country’s leading experts on the NHS have to clarify that what they are saying does not constitute an allegation of fraud against NHS finance directors up and down the country, we should take it as an indication that something is amiss.

Their article (which sadly is behind a paywall) describes how unrealistic demands are routinely made of NHS systems and providers, which are expected to deliver large and unspecified “efficiencies” without compromising the health care services they provide. It quotes a former local authority finance director who, on moving into the NHS, described “almost a mass collusion that doing ‘more with less’ was possible on this grand a scale.”

For the most part, NHS organisations play along with this for fear of being the first to step out of line and give NHS England the “wrong answer.” Occasionally though, one breaks cover. Another Health Service Journal article from last year [£] quoted leaders of a health system in Yorkshire openly admitting that they had changed their financial plans to say that they would break even as part of the “tactics of engaging with NHS England.” To be clear, however, this is not fraud.

Politics with different sizes of “p”

The NHS may well be the most politicised health system in the world. In a June 2022 edition of Radio 4’s The Briefing Room (18:24 onwards), Mark Pearson of the OECD identifies this as the main reason why the NHS seems to be struggling more than some other, similarly structured health systems. Politically-driven tinkering means that successive health secretaries introduce new reforms before the dust has settled on the last round. We never let anything play out and never learn what works.

Another consequence of this extreme politicisation is that unrealistic have-your-cake-and-eat-it demands come from the top. Ministers find it convenient to claim – and easy to get away with claiming – that the NHS can do more with less. Prevention, better integration of services, technology or unspecified “reform” are the balancing figure between what we want the NHS to be and the amount of money that the government is willing to spend. The problem is that prevention doesn’t save money and, despite years of trying, the NHS has still not found a replicable model of “integrated care” that delivers efficiencies. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, in health care, “unlike most industries, technological innovations are generally cost-escalating rather than cost-containing.”

This cakeism permeates through the system. NHS England demands that health care systems and providers submit balanced financial plans, which say they will keep costs within their funding allocations. Alongside this, they are expected to manage changes in local demand for services and deliver on a range of centrally-determined priorities. The internal politics of the NHS mean that many finance directors decide that it’s better to submit a balanced plan that you are never going to stick to than be honest from the outset. NHS England knows exactly what is going on but finds it politically convenient to play along rather than call out unrealistic plans.

These politically-motivated fictions have a big impact on how the NHS is run. To understand why, we need to think about how complex systems work.

Unviable systems

In the 1980s, Stafford Beer developed the Viable System Model[1]. Starting from fundamental principles about managing complexity, the model describes how different layers of a system interact, the elements that need to be in place, and how information should be shared. If we can get our organisations working like this, they should be able to deal with complex stuff – like the health needs of a population – while being resilient to change and uncertainty.

In the model, the relationship between two layers of a system – say, between the senior management of an organisation and one of its operational divisions, or between health care commissioners and providers in one part of the country – is defined by the “resource bargain”. This describes the resources that are allocated and what is expected to be delivered in return. For example, the orthopaedic department in a hospital will be given a budget and expected to carry out a certain number of hip replacements and knee surgeries. The resource bargain defines the accountability that each part of the system has to higher levels of management. It also defines the autonomy that the department has: it can make changes to how it operates as long as it is still delivering the agreed outputs and staying within its budget.

Resource bargains in the NHS are agreed every year through the financial and operational planning process. NHS England sets financial allocations for each Integrated Care System. Annual planning guidance is published, describing priorities for the year, and this sits alongside a menagerie of longer-term plans and policies, many of which are “mandatory”. Integrated Care Boards then commission services from NHS trusts and set up contracts that say how much money each organisation will get and what it will provide in return.

The problem is that at one end of this chain of resource bargains are the claims made by ministers and at the other end is reality. Each layer of the system can choose to play along with the convenient fiction of always doing more with less, but reality tends to be less compliant. This tension has to be held somewhere, whether that’s an NHS provider spending more that it said it would, or clinical services being unable to deliver agreed levels of performance with the staff they can afford.

The “wretchedness” of NHS financial planning described by Murray and Anandaciva means that the resource bargains that should define autonomy and accountability throughout the NHS are wretched. What’s more, everyone involved knows this. But to be clear, this is not fraud.

Bad management

There are at least three ways in which this undermines good management in the NHS.

The first is that they are a huge and costly distraction. Senior managers spend large amounts of time and money on plans that they know aren’t realistic and aren’t going to happen. A fictional “breakeven” plan will be developed at the start of a financial year. When reality refuses to play along, a “recovery plan” is developed, perhaps with the help of expensive management consultants. This is supported by an “ambitious efficiency programme” with wildly optimistic savings. Board-level directors and chief executives spend large amounts of time in meetings about this stuff, which they all know is nonsense. This is not only expensive, but it takes managers away from the real business of running the NHS.

Another issue is that, after a while, people stop listening. They know that at the start of every year a “balanced” plan will be agreed; that part way through they year there will be a crisis when spending goes off track; and that towards the end of the year some money will be found to make it good. A rational response to this is to treat it all as noise. So senior managers find not only that they are spending their time managing fictions rather than reality, but that no one takes their exhortations to save money very seriously anymore. The resource bargains cease to function as a unit of accountability and managers often fill the gap with fear and a generalised sense of pressure.

A third problem is that putting unrealistic expectations onto health care teams makes the experience of working for the NHS much worse. When teams are told they have to do more with less, when the political narrative is that they should be meeting the needs of the population but they don’t have the resources to do so, NHS staff are overworked and still feel like they are failing. This is one factor driving the NHS’s rolling workforce crisis.

Altogether these issues leave the NHS less well managed than it should be, less efficient than it could be, and a worse place to work.

A politicised health system needs better politics

To give the former health secretary Andrew Lansley his dues (I know, but bear with me) he did identify this problem when he said we needed to take politics out of the NHS. Unfortunately, it is much easier to point at a problem than it is to solve it, and his solution – the separation of NHS England from the Department of Health – didn’t work. The NHS, and the expectations that are set for it, remain as politicised today as they were in 2009.

This is because the NHS is not politicised for structural reasons but for political ones. At the time of writing, the latest YouGov data has 44% of voters citing the NHS as one of the top issues facing the country, second only to the economy. Politicians chasing votes are competing on the promises they make about the NHS and none of them seem to think that “this is NHS England’s decision and I won’t meddle” is a very good line.

So if we can’t realistically take politics out of the NHS, we are left with the hope that we will have a better and more honest politics that is more focused on actually trying to improve things than media soundbites. Like I said, it’s much easier to point at a problem than to solve it.

Protecting the system

If the NHS is stuck with politically-driven fictions then managers at each level of the system have a choice. They can either pass the problem down the chain or they can try to shield the NHS and set realistic resource bargains that allow the system to function effectively. Finance directors in Integrated Care Boards can either demand the impossible when they commission services from providers, or they can have honest discussions about how they manage external expectations and deliver the best outcomes for their population. NHS providers can choose whether or not they pass unrealistic demands onto clinical teams.

This takes us back to the “tactics of engaging with NHS England.” Senior managers have to walk a political tightrope to avoid regulatory intervention while maintaining realistic and deliverable plans for their organisations. But if we want the NHS to be more effective and efficient – and a nicer place to work – then we need to reduce how much of it is exposed to, and how much management time is spent on, wretched financial plans.


[1] If you want to apply the Viable System Model to your organisation you should get hold of a copy of Stafford Beer’s Diagnosing the System for Organisations. If you want to know more about the topic but prefer to read something entertaining then you can pre-order Dan Davies’ new book. 

The limits of utilitarianism in health care

Lord Sumption has come under fire for comments he made in BBC a debate about whether lockdown was “punishing too many for the greater good”, where he told a woman with stage 4 cancer that her life was “less valuable” than other people’s.

He was saying this as part of his argument against lockdown, which is broadly that it punishes the young to save the old. Others have pointed out that this argument doesn’t work, because the young are hardly going to benefit from an overwhelmed NHS, dead parents and collapsing consumer spending among the wealthiest age group. Covid policy is not, in general, a trade-off between wealth and health, and it’s certainly not a zero sum game between generations.

But I want to set that aside and look at the argument on its own merits. Do we, and should we, consider some people’s lives less valuable than others when setting health care and wider government policy?

Within health care, there are places where we are very explicit about how we value lives. When NICE looks at the cost-effectiveness of new drugs, it will only approve them for use in the NHS if they cost less than £20,000 to £30,000 for each QALY (quality adjusted life year) they deliver[i]. A lifesaving intervention for a younger and healthier person will, other things being equal, deliver more QALYs than one for an older, sicker person, so we are willing to pay more for it. When it comes to how much we pay for drugs, we are explicitly utilitarian.

When we look more broadly at health care activities, however, things get messier. While health economists and policy-makers do try to assess the cost-effectiveness of interventions in a broadly utilitarian way, the reality of delivering health care often works out differently. For all the talk of prioritising community care and prevention, funding and activity continue to be sucked into hospitals and emergency care, and the last two years of someone’s life are by far the most expensive for health care. This is partly about the difficulty of managing change in a complex system, but also because there is a moral framework at play here that isn’t strictly utilitarian – we feel obligated to help people who need it and to “save someone’s life”, even if we might get more QALYs using the money somewhere else.

The allocation of government resources beyond health care diverges even further from a utilitarian ideal. While the cost-effectiveness of policies is assessed, the concept of QALYs is largely limited to health policy evaluation and there is no grand model that ensures a pound doesn’t get spent on roads if it could deliver slightly higher marginal utility in schools. Moreover, spending isn’t really allocated according to cost-benefit analysis when it comes down to it. The Treasury coordinates a fairly rigorous spending review process with other departments, but decisions on what money goes where will ultimately be made by ministers, based on what they think the public want and what they think will win them votes.

And so we end up with our public resources distributed through a messy combination of utilitarianism, public opinion, politics and accident. While this does lead to some indefensible decisions and pork-barrel politics, the fact that we have such a mixed approach is not a regrettable failure to implement our utilitarian principles, but a reflection of what we actually believe. There is a tension between our utilitarian sensibilities and our ethical and democratic ideals that all people are equal. Although we try to formalise this to some degree by looking at equalities alongside cost-benefit analyses, “equalities impact assessments” are often a bit of an afterthought, and we don’t have a way of trading of net utility against equalities – they are two separate frames that remain in tension.

This is where Lord Sumption gets it wrong – or at least voices a fringe opinion. There is a place for utilitarianism in public policy. It’s an important part of what people believe is fair, and can be implemented pretty explicitly in narrow applications like NICE’s drug assessments. But if we let it become our whole approach for allocating resources or deciding on policy, we ignore a widespread and fundamental belief that all people are equal, with equal rights, including the right to life. The next thing you know, you are on the BBC telling people who are old or disabled (both protected characteristics in equalities law!) that they are worth less than others. It’s not clear that this is ethically sound or sustainable in a democracy. We’re better off with the messy compromise that we’ve got.


[i] The fact that the threshold is in fact a range might suggest that the process is not as strictly utilitarian as it first appears.

Do the Covid vaccines vindicate our model of pharmaceutical development?

The development of three highly effective vaccines in record time was not only a rare piece of good news in 2020, but an incredible scientific achievement – and one delivered by our much-maligned drug companies. So often seen as the bad guys, Big Pharma has ridden to our rescue when we needed them the most. So does this mean that our system of drug development is working just fine after all?

It is said that war is a major driver of innovation. The idea is that an all-consuming threat brings a clarity of purpose and focuses a nation’s resources on solving specific problems. This leads to technological jumps in certain areas, which then have wider applicability when the war is over – in aviation, radar or nuclear physics. The Covid-19 pandemic was the pharmaceutical industry’s war. While in normal times research and development is spread across a range of diseases, suddenly it was absolutely clear what the priority was – and, crucially, absolutely clear that if you developed an effective treatment or vaccine you would sell bucketloads of it. With such a singular clarity of purpose, our drug development system has delivered, and in some style.

But what does this impressive system do in peacetime? Like any other market, the answer is that efforts are directed towards the things that are most likely to make money. Unlike many other markets, however, the ability to make money is entirely dependent on government regulation – and specifically patents. This is because pharmaceutical R&D is very expensive, but the marginal cost of manufacturing a drug is very cheap. The value of R&D is held in the intellectual property, so for there to be any incentive to develop new drugs, this needs protecting. While drugs are under patent they are hugely profitable because the manufacturer is granted a government-sanctioned monopoly, but as soon as the patent expires anyone can manufacture a generic version and the profitability largely evaporates.

The problem with profits relying so heavily on regulation is that the nature and specific detail of those regulations – rather than patient demand or social benefit – start to be the main factors driving behaviour. This has resulted in the development of a range of “me-too drugs”, designed to be just different enough from an existing product to get a fresh patent, with little regard to whether they provide a significant benefit to patients over and above what’s currently available. In normal times, a large slice of pharmaceutical R&D effort goes into these sorts of products, which are a less risky way to deliver profits than pursuing genuinely novel products.

In stark contrast to the response to Covid-19, these incentives leave some of our biggest public health concerns woefully underserved by pharmaceutical R&D. More than 700,000 people are estimated to die each year as a result of antimicrobial resistant infections, which the WHO describes as a global crisis. But this crisis – or rather the volume of drugs that you would sell if you fixed it – just isn’t big enough to convince the industry that it’s worth going through the expensive and risky R&D process required to develop genuinely novel medicines. Many drug companies have simply stopped working on new antibiotics. Of those that are in development, many are me-too products with limited benefits over what’s already available and only two out of 50 are active against the multi-drug resistant Gram-negative bacteria, which the WHO considers a top priority.

This year has shown the incredible scientific capability that we have been able to maintain across our universities and the pharmaceutical industry, and how effectively they can work together to develop innovative techniques and crack difficult problems. Whatever else our system has or has not been doing, we can be thankful that it has achieved this. But we also know that in normal times, the current system of regulations and incentives fails to target this capacity at our biggest public health problems.

There are two different lessons we might take from this. One is that, in the absence of anything better, we at least have a system that maintains an impressive capacity that can deliver incredible results if we ever find ourselves in a truly all-consuming crisis. Poorly targeted R&D in normal times might be a price worth paying for this, and allowing companies to play the regulations for huge profits a necessary evil. Or we may take the view that this year has shown us what could be possible under a different system. If we were able to focus pharmaceutical R&D on novel discovery in areas of genuine priority, perhaps we could deliver astounding results every year, without the need for a global pandemic.

Pull the lever

Why you should probably vote for the least bad party that can win in your constituency

It’s election day and we’ve got choices to make. Of course, we have choices to make every time an election comes around, but for many people – seemingly more than usual – none of the options are very appealing. As ever, there are only two parties capable of forming a government, but the realisation in recent years that both have serious problems with institutional racism has left many people feeling that voting for either is morally unacceptable.

So what should you do in this situation? Some of us are lucky enough to have an easy answer. If you live in a seat where another party (that you actually like) can win then you can simply vote for them. If you live in a very safe Tory or Labour seat then you can also vote for your favourite party knowing that it won’t affect the election result. But if you live in a Tory/Labour marginal, then I’m afraid that you are stuck in a trolley problem.

The trolley problem is a thought experiment where a trolley (or a train) is hurtling along and five people are tied to the track ahead. If you do nothing they will be killed. There is a lever to divert the train down another track to which one person is tied. If you pull the lever you will save five people but kill one – what is the morally right thing to do?

The point of the though experiment is to explore the moral equivalence between action and inaction: is doing nothing morally neutral, or are you responsible for five deaths? If you pull the lever are you a murderer or have you saved four lives? While this has been the subject of years of debate among moral philosophy undergraduates, empirical research suggests that nine in ten of us would pull the lever.

What this means is that most of us don’t consider abstention a morally neutral choice. If both options are unpalatable, but one is worse than the other, failing to choose the less bad option allows the worst to happen. If you find both the Tories and Labour unpalatable, but believe that one is worse than the other – for example if you oppose racism but believe in strong public services / think that nationalisation would be a disaster – then voting for a third party in a Tory/Labour marginal means you are not using your vote to prevent the worst outcome.

I’m not here to tell you what’s morally right, and the fact that nine in ten would pull the lever in a trolley problem means that 10% of us don’t think that’s the right thing to do. But if you are in the majority that would pull the lever, and you find yourself in a trolley problem today, then you should vote for the least bad candidate with a chance of winning, however unpalatable you find them.

Gotta get yer gotchas right

The gotchas around the Conservative pledge to recruit 50,000 more nurses are wrong – but the truth is actually worse.

The Conservative announcement that they will “deliver 50,000 more nurses” has not gone down as they would have hoped. Labour has picked up on the fact that some of this increase will be delivered by better retention of existing staff. Nicky Morgan had a particularly uncomfortable experience trying to explain her way out of this on Good Morning Britain, as presenters (and probably viewers) became increasingly incredulous.

The problem is that this criticism is wrong-headed. Increasing the size of the nursing workforce isn’t just a case of saying so – it’s a stocks and flows problem. If we want a larger nursing workforce, we need to increase the flows in (through more attractive, better-funded training, or recruitment of nurses from overseas) and decrease the flows out (through better retention). The Conservative manifesto refers to policies that are designed to do this, such as reinstating the bursary for student nurses. We might think that the 50,000 figure is overegging the effects of these policies – the Health Foundation has said that in reality half will need to come from overseas – but you wouldn’t want to attempt this without looking at retention.

That said, there’s a bigger problem with this commitment – or at least how it is being sold and understood. The manifesto costings earmark £759m for this policy in the first year. You may have noticed that this is much less than the cost of employing 50,000 nurses (which Full Fact has estimated as at least £2.8bn). That’s because this money isn’t for paying nurses salaries at all. It is just for the policies, like the student bursary, that the government hopes will improve recruitment and retention. It means that NHS England may have a better supply of skilled nurses to employ, but it doesn’t pay their wages.

So what does this mean for the number of nurses that will actually be working in the NHS? Well, what it certainly does not mean is that there will be 50,000 more nurses working in our hospitals and communities than there would be in the absence of this announcement. That’s not to say nurse staffing levels won’t rise: the government has already announced increased NHS funding for the coming years and some of that might be spent on providing more nursing. But this new policy is about developing the nursing workforce, not about funding more nursing care.

Almost everything I have read about the policy has misunderstood this point – and I doubt that would have been lost on the authors of the manifesto. Much cheaper to announce some measures that you hope will lead to better recruitment and retention and let everyone think there will be 50,000 more nurses working in the NHS than to find the £2.8bn that would actually cost. There has to be a strong suspicion that this was a deliberate attempt to mislead.

The correct gotcha is therefore this: will there be 50,000 more nurses working in the NHS as a result of this policy? If so, the numbers don’t add up, since £750m can only pay for around a quarter of that number of nurse salaries. If not, can we be clear that this is just about training, recruiting and retaining people to fill existing jobs, or jobs that the NHS is already planning to create with previously announced funding?

Although, to be fair, that would not have been nearly as effective on Good Morning Britain.

The distributional implications of universality (again)

Paul Johnson, the director of the IFS, has an article in the Times (also available on the IFS website without a paywall) about how different ideas about fairness are behind some of our political disagreements. There’s plenty to agree with in the piece. But when he touches on a couple of themes that regular readers of the Policy Sketchbook will be somewhere between familiar with and bored of – social care reform and redistribution – Paul says some things that I think are a bit misleading.

Here are the offending paragraphs:

“The Conservatives got into dreadful trouble over their manifesto proposals on social care funding. We have spent decades making no progress on how to reform the funding system, partly because of the way we think about fairness. Some think it unfair that anyone should have to use their own assets, including their house, to pay for care. Yet one of the reasons why proposals to cap the amount that anyone has to pay have not been implemented is because, compared with the system we have today, the winners would be the relatively well-off.

In fact, this is a fundamental disagreement about the role of the state as much as it is about fairness. If you think the state is there to provide a degree of social insurance, stepping in where private insurance markets don’t work to pay for those who are unlucky enough to need care, then you are likely to favour it paying all the costs above a certain level. That’s how we tend to think of the NHS. But if you think the state is there just to redistribute money from rich to poor then you might think it unfair.”

This is a familiar take: moving to universal benefits means less redistribution and benefits the well-off. But is it true? Well, that depends. The most important thing to remember when thinking about the distributional impact of changes in government spending is that the money doesn’t just appear out of thin air. The effect of a policy on the level of redistribution that government does depends on how it is paid for. By choosing different funding sources you can get pretty much any distributional effect you want, but some scenarios are more relevant and plausible than others.

Three different ways of paying for a universal benefit

So let’s take a look at the distributional consequences of moving from a means-tested benefit to a universal one, paid for in different ways. We’ll use a stylised example for clarity, but the conclusions generalise pretty well. Imagine we have a benefit worth £1000 per person, but means-tested so that only the bottom 30% of the income distribution get it. An independent commission recommends making this universal, so that everyone gets the benefit regardless of their income. There are broadly three ways we can pay for this and each has different distributional consequences.

Reducing means-tested benefits to pay for universal benefits is regressive

One way to pay for the new universal benefit would be to reprioritise some money that is currently spent on means-tested benefits. It’s trivial to see that this is going to be regressive, but let’s run the numbers anyway. Let’s say we take the money that is currently spent on our stylised means-tested benefit and use it to fund a universal version. Instead of the bottom 30% of the income distribution getting a benefit worth £1000, everyone now gets one worth £300. The bottom 30% lose £700 each and everyone else gains £300. This is nailed-on regressive and it would be a similar story if the money were reprioritised from some other area of means-tested spending.

Means-testing one universal benefit to pay for another is distributionally neutral

Another way of paying for the new universal benefit is to reduce universality in another area. This is the sort of thing that was discussed in the wake of the Dilnot Report: universal coverage for social care could be funded by means-testing some of the universal benefits that older people currently get, like winter fuel allowance or free bus passes. The distributional consequences of the switch would depend on the details, but it would be roughly neutral – we are taking money away from the same people who will get more from the new benefit.

Paying for a universal benefit through higher taxes hits the rich

The third way that we could pay for the new universal benefit is through higher taxes. We can design taxes with various distributional profiles, but we can get an idea of who would be hit by a “typical” tax rise if we look at the distribution of current UK taxes as a whole.

The chart below (based on ONS data) shows the distributional impact of extending our £1000 benefit to the whole population and funding it through an increase in “general taxation” – by which we mean a tax rise with the same distributional profile as the current UK tax system. The (positive) green bars show the additional benefits people in each income decile get and the (negative) red bars show the additional taxes they pay. The red and green bars sum to zero because, at risk of labouring the point, the money has not appeared out of thin air.

The winners from this shift to universal benefits are not the poorest, who already got the benefit, but it would be misleading to say they are the “relatively well-off”. The winners are the people in the middle, especially those just above the current means-test threshold. The biggest losers by far (in cash terms) are the richest 10%. This is a key point: the main distributional effect of a tax-funded change from means-tested to universal benefits is to move money from the people at the top of the income distribution to the people in the middle.

But you may have noticed something else in the chart. The bottom 30% of the income distribution also lose out, because they pay more tax and don’t get any additional benefit. They don’t pay much in absolute terms, but relative to their income it’s quite a lot. The chart below shows the same figures as a proportion of income: the richest still pay the most on this measure, but now the poorest are not far behind.

Now, unless you think that the bottom 30% do rather too well out of government as things stand, this doesn’t seem particularly fair. Luckily, it’s cheap to fix, since the bottom 30% only pays 7% of the cost of this policy if the money is raised through general taxation. If we were to exempt them from these tax rises, we’d still have enough to fund a universal benefit worth £970 for the rest of the population. But the point is worth noting: if universal benefits are to be funded through tax rises, the additional taxes shouldn’t hit the poorest.

The size of the state

So we’ve seen three different ways of paying for a new universal benefit with three different distributional effects: regressive, neutral and progressive. It should be obvious by now that unless you are clear which one of these you think will happen, you shouldn’t be saying anything about the distributional consequences.

How we assume the additional spending will be balanced rather depends on our assumptions about the size of the state. If we believe that tax rises are impossible or highly undesirable, then we are going to want a new universal benefit to be paid for by reprioritising spending. Up to a point we can reprioritise from other universal benefits and get something distributionally neutral – but so much of the British state is already means-tested that (unless you are willing to go for pensions or the NHS) there is limited capacity for such reprioritisation. With a fixed public spending envelope and tax profile there is only so much universality you can afford if you also want to do a certain amount of redistribution and under these assumptions, Paul’s claim that “the winners would be the relatively well-off” is just about defensible – although for a small spending item like the Dilnot reforms it would be quite easy to reprioritise spending in a neutral or progressive way.

But if we assume that more universal benefits will mean higher taxes then the picture looks very different. As shown above, the biggest losers from this would be the richest and the winners would be the people in the middle. And there are a couple of reasons to believe that this is ultimately the more reasonable assumption.

The first is that the people who are in favour of universal benefits tend to be the people who are in favour of higher taxes. Elect a government that does one, they are likely to do the other. We can see this in the recent Labour manifesto, where universal free university tuition was proposed, funded by an increase in income tax. Although the Dilnot Commission didn’t say much about how its proposals should be funded, the previous abortive attempt at social care reform (Labour’s National Care Service) was to be funded by an increase in inheritance tax.

The second is that countries with more universal benefits tend to have higher tax rates. There’s more going on in these figures than just universality versus means-testing, but in general the countries with the most universal benefits, such as the Nordics, France and Belgium, raise the most in taxes. Internationally, means-testing goes with low taxes and universality goes with high taxes.

Some conclusions

To be fair to Paul, he is far from the only person to go around saying that universal benefits are regressive. It’s even true under certain assumptions – specifically that the UK must remain a low tax country. The problem is that no one who writes opinion pieces saying that universal benefits are regressive ever seems to find space to clarify that this is their assumption. If they did, readers would probably notice that this isn’t what the proponents of universality are usually proposing, and it isn’t what countries with more universal benefits do. Moving towards a European model with more universal benefits and higher taxes would most likely amount to a transfer from the rich to the people in the middle of the income distribution. I doubt that fans of redistribution would, as Paul suggests, think this is unfair.

Prevention, longevity and health system costs

Kailash Chand has a piece in the Guardian arguing that unless the NHS fundamentally changes its approach to focus on prevention rather than cure, it will not be financially sustainable. This reminds me that many well-informed people hold inconsistent views on prevention and health spending.

Ask most people why health spending is rising and they’ll tell you it’s because people are living longer. But why are we living longer? According to the Lancet, the main causes are falling tobacco use in men – the result of a hugely successful public health campaign to prevent smoking-related diseases – and falling cardiovascular mortality – which is closely related to how much exercise we do. So prevention is a major driver of people living longer, and people living longer is leading to higher health care costs. Does that mean that prevention is bankrupting the NHS?

We can begin to unscramble this mess when we realise that mostprojectionsof health spending estimate that the contribution of ageing populations to spending growth is quite small, because as people live longer lives they are also healthier at any given age. This is reflected in the fact that a large proportion of health care costs relate to the last few years of someone’s life, however long that life is. An 85-year-old has on average a third of their health care costs still to come, but someone who dies younger doesn’t avoid these costs, they just incur them earlier.

So dying is expensive, but not all deaths are equally dear. A recent US study found that dementia is the most expensive way to die, once social care and out-of-pocket spending are factored in. This is bad news because we don’t really know how to prevent dementia. There are some promising interventions, and recent evidence suggests that age-specific rates might be falling, but the evidence that we can prevent dementia is currently fairly weak. The risk of developing dementia rises rapidly with age, so it’s plausible that if we prevent people from dying of other things then they will live long enough to develop dementia and end up costing the NHS more.

Now I’m not really trying to argue that prevention increases costs. It’s very complicated to work that out and, at a whole system level, empirical evidence is hard to come by. Moreover, there are some areas where prevention does seem to save money. A recent evaluation of diabetes prevention in the NHS found that it was likely to be cost saving (after 12 years) – and to be fair, diabetes is one of the examples that Kailash cites. Targeted interventions like this, especially those focusing on diseases like diabetes that don’t kill us but cost money, could help with sustainability. But it’s far from clear that a system-wide shift towards prevention is going to stop health spending from going up.

This is no reason not to do more prevention, of course. Living longer and with fewer diseases is a great thing in itself and if preventive interventions can help us to do that then we should implement them, whether they are cheaper or more expensive than our current approach to health care.

But acting as if prevention (or integration, or anything else) is the answer to all of our concerns about the sustainability of health spending is not helpful. It reinforces the idea that rising health spending is a symptom of failure and always bad – but if what we get for the money is longer, healthier lives, it might well be worth it. And in doing so it lets the current government off the hook for their persistent underfunding of services and distracts from more important questions. If we want the NHS to meet the needs of an ageing population and provide us with the latest treatments, we might just have to accept that this means putting in more public money and paying for this through higher taxes.