We are two months in and, as far as NHS reform goes, the new government is still in a stage of political positioning and information gathering.
Lord Darzi’s report, published yesterday, tells us that the NHS is in a bad state. Everything is worse than it was in 2010: waiting lists have soared, cancer outcomes are lagging behind comparable countries, and nearly one in ten people attending A&E now waits for over 12 hours (yes, you read that right). On top of this, a decade of mismanagement and under-resourcing left the NHS weakened and less able to respond to the global pandemic than other health systems – an idea reminiscent of Chris Cook’s contemporaneous writing on how the British state’s obsession with efficiency had left the NHS far too fragile.
Although Darzi identifies some themes that need addressing, specific policy recommendations were outside the scope of the review. We will have to wait until next spring when the new government publishes its ten-year strategy to hear what they plan to do about all of this. However, Wes Streeting has given us regular clues as to what he thinks the priorities are for NHS reform, talking about three big shifts: from hospital to community, from analogue to digital; and from sickness to prevention.
Anyone with a passing familiarity with NHS politics and policy will immediately notice two things. The first is that these three shifts are terribly familiar. They are mantras that have been repeated by most of Streeting’s predecessors as Health Secretary, to the point that they sound almost like meaningless clichés.
The second is that, despite this remarkable consistency, the NHS has failed to deliver on any of them. While telling everyone that care is moving out of hospital, the NHS has consistently increased funding for acute care quicker than for community care. For all the dubious excitement about AI, the NHS has a history of failed IT programmes and struggles with fragmented systems and data. And a narrative about the importance of prevention has been accompanied by significant cuts to public health grants over the past decade. As Darzi puts it “the NHS has implemented the inverse of its stated strategy”.
As such, rather than asking what the new government’s priorities for the NHS are or should be, it may be more worthwhile to ask what they need to do to have a chance of bucking recent trends and actually delivering on some of the things they say they want to do. Rather than focusing on priorities, we need to start talking about meta-priorities – the things that need to be addressed to give any priorities a chance of succeeding. Without any claim to completeness, I am going to propose four.
1. Actually try to improve things
The first meta-priority should be the easiest, but political realities are not always thus. Any serious attempt to deliver on Streeting’s three big shifts has to start with a government that is acting in good faith and actually trying to improve the delivery of public services – rather than looking at polls and headlines and managing its public messaging.
This would be, to say the least, a reversal of recent trends. While ministers should have been tackling the appalling condition of much of the NHS estate, they instead decided they liked the phrase “40 new hospitals” and tried to convince us that they could simply redefine what that phrase means so that it wasn’t a lie. In place of serious discussion about how the NHS is run, we have for years been served vague and largely meaningless concepts like “integration”.
The barriers to acting in this way should be lower now than at any point over the past decade. Labour politicians and voters are more ideologically committed to public services than their Conservative counterparts. And a new government – especially one inheriting a legacy of obviously degraded public services – has a decent window of opportunity in which they can be honest about the problems with the NHS and blame them on the other guys.
This government seems keen to make the most of this opportunity, and the brutal assessments in the Darzi review are a start. But they need to get out of campaigning mode and into governing mode. They need to use some of that political capital to solve the many difficult and inconvenient problems that the NHS faces. And they need to have the courage to keep actually trying to improve things once the honeymoon period is over and the next election looms.
2. Turn off the false assurance machine
The problem with having a government that cares more about managing public opinion than improving the NHS is that this behaviour permeates the system. All the minister really wants is a good line to spin to the press and the public, so all they need from NHS England is a plausible story that things are going well and/or there is a plan for things to go well in the future. This is then the demand that goes down through each layer of the system: tell me a plausible story that things are fine.
This manifests most traceably in the utter nonsense that is NHS financial planning, where local health systems are required to give NHS England the “right answer”, which is that they can deliver on the numerous promises that have been made to the public while sticking to the budgets handed down to them. Local NHS leaders dutifully submit fictional plans and wait to be told how naughty they are when the fictions do not become reality.
But it’s also evident in the way that the NHS reports and manages its performance. NHS England requires the right numbers on a narrow set of targets that imperfectly represent a tiny proportion of the complexity that the NHS is managing. Local health systems do what they can to give the right answers, even if they don’t believe that’s an accurate description of what’s going on.
If the purpose of a system is what it does, then the purpose of the various layers of NHS management is to generate false assurance. And running this false assurance machine is expensive. Some of the most highly paid people in the NHS are spending large amounts of their time providing the right answers to the layers above them rather than doing the hard and boring work of improving the system below them. As Darzi says, “the NHS encourages too many to look upwards rather than to those that they are there to serve”.
Turning this machine off starts with the political courage to actually try to improve things, but it will take much more than that. These behaviours are deeply entrenched in NHS organisations and people will need to feel safe before they can act differently. Changing a huge and complex system is hard and will take time. But it is essential: you are going to struggle to improve a system that is not providing you with honest information.
3. Spend money where it is really needed
The UK public sector has a strange and enduring ideology that says you cannot simply spend money to improve things. The problem, you see, is one of incentives. If health systems get more money when they are struggling, where is the incentive for them to, you know, stop struggling? Health systems are seen as rational actors in an economic model, in a weird conflation of the senior managers who are supposed to be running the thing (and whose pay is unrelated to these performance measures) and the population that suffers when bad management is compounded by a withholding of further government funding.
Darzi makes the case for financial incentives and competition playing a role in driving improvement in some parts of the NHS. He argues that they are “part of the way in which the NHS got to peak performance” in the 2000s. But the 2012 reforms introduced by Andrew Lansley took this to a ridiculous extreme by “dissolving the NHS management line” and creating a fragmented and baffling system searching in vain for the magic of the market.
Since then, we have seen a series of increasingly bizarre “payment for performance” schemes. When the Better Care Fund was launched in 2013 as a pooled budget between the NHS and local government, £1bn of the £3.8bn was allocated based on performance. Systems that saw reductions in avoidable emergency admissions and delays in discharging patients would be given more money than those that struggled to shift those measures. More recently, NHS England decided to allocate desperately needed capital investment to the hospital trusts that performed best (or improved most) on the highly political A&E 4-hour target.
Following the OBR’s recent finding that public investment boosts long-term growth, the government may have political cover to make the big investments that are required to fix NHS infrastructure. It’s important that this money goes where it’s needed and is not coopted into some Freakonomics-inspired game of incentives. This may require Number 10 to face down the ultimate source of this ideology: His Majesty’s Treasury.
4. Shift the locus of political accountability
While there is a narrative in the UK that the NHS is a unique and special health system, many experts argue that it is not so different from what you find in other countries. It does distinguish itself, however, by being more politicised and more centralised than its peers.
It is perhaps unavoidable and even desirable that the NHS is politicised, since health and social care make up over 20% of government spending. The problem is that, in a highly centralised system, the politics of health care become centralised. When local NHS leaders talk about their accountability to local populations, they are talking about a sense of moral duty. Their real, hard-edged accountability is to the people who can tell them what to do or remove them from their jobs – NHS England. If people want better health care services where they live, any political pressure has to be directed at a national level, to the Secretary of State and to central government.
This matters because people’s views of issues at a national level can be unmoored from their local experiences. I remember, many years ago, seeing a presentation from Ben Page of Ipsos Mori, in which he showed that people – wherever they lived – tended to think that the NHS near them was rather good, but that nationally it was in a bad state. The inference was that people formed opinions of local services based on their own experiences and opinions of the NHS as a whole based on media reports. For similar reasons, areas with the lowest levels of immigration are often the most strongly opposed to it.
This means that national-level political accountability has a relatively weak link to people’s experiences of the NHS. And what’s more, the link is mediated by layers of NHS management and media reporting, encouraging some of the problems described above. When people are upset that their local hospital is crumbling, ministers talk about the “40 new hospitals” they are building, generating headlines but not fixing any ceilings. When people want better access to local services, ministers produce statistics generated by the false assurance machine.
Shifting the locus of political accountability to a local level could bring political incentives into line with the realities of how people experience their local NHS services. This could in turn solve some of the political and systemic problems outlined above. But the weakness of local government in England may make this impossible in the short term. England is “an international outlier in its lack of local power and autonomy for sub-national government” and the previous government went out of its way to remove further powers and autonomy from local authorities.
Labour has talked about a “devolution revolution”. Like Wes Streeting’s NHS priorities, these are familiar words that have not to date been matched by actions. But if we really are going to see a growing role for local democracy and a genuine transfer of power from central government, this could open up longer-term options for fixing some of the NHS’s most pervasive problems.